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In this paper we analyze the value of delegation in a two-period agency. A central man-
agement hires an agent to perform a personal e⁄ort in each period. Due to time constraints
or lack of ability this e⁄ort can not be performed by central management. Besides personal
e⁄ort ￿rm value is in￿ uenced by the decision to launch a project which has to be made
at the beginning of period two. The project decision can either be delegated to the agent
(decentralization) or it can be made by central management (centralization). Under de-
centralization the agent observes the project￿ s contribution before its decision. While this
captures the bene￿t of delegation its cost is that the project decision is unobservable and
must be motivated together with personal e⁄ort via the same incentive contract. In the
centralized regime, in contrast, no incentives for the project decision are necessary, how-
ever, the project￿ s actual contribution will not be observed such that the project decision
has to be made based on expectations. We analyze optimal performance measurement for
both regimes in a linear contracting setting and analyze the variables that a⁄ect the value
of delegation. We do this for two di⁄erent contracting regimes: long-term commitment and
long-term renegotiation-proof contracts. Trade-o⁄s under both contracting environments dif-
fer substantially. In particular, under renegotiation-proof contracts, decentralization might
become optimal even if its direct bene￿t in terms of acquiring speci￿c knowledge about the
project vanishes. The reason is that with delegation of the project decision central man-
agement implicitly commits to a higher second period incentive rate as personal e⁄ort and
the project decision must be controlled via the same incentive contract. This is bene￿cial if
renegotiation-proofness requires central management to set too low second-period incentives
compared to long-term commitment. A necessary condition for that is, that intertemporal
correlation is negative. Contrary to the classical view this result implies that the incentive
problem under centralization may become more severe than under decentralization.
1The Value of Delegation in a Dynamic Agency
Abstract:
In this paper we analyze the value of delegation in a two-period agency. A central management
hires an agent to perform a personal e⁄ort in each period. Due to time constraints or lack of
ability this e⁄ort can not be performed by central management. Besides personal e⁄ort ￿rm
value is in￿ uenced by the decision to launch a project which has to be made at the beginning of
period two. The project decision can either be delegated to the agent (decentralization) or it can
be made by central management (centralization). Under decentralization the agent observes the
project￿ s contribution before its decision. While this captures the bene￿t of delegation its cost is
that the project decision is unobservable and must be motivated together with personal e⁄ort via
the same incentive contract. In the centralized regime, in contrast, no incentives for the project
decision are necessary, however, the project￿ s actual contribution will not be observed such that
the project decision has to be made based on expectations. We analyze optimal performance
measurement for both regimes in a linear contracting setting and analyze the variables that a⁄ect
the value of delegation. We do this for two di⁄erent contracting regimes: long-term commitment
and long-term renegotiation-proof contracts. Trade-o⁄s under both contracting environments
di⁄er substantially. In particular, under renegotiation-proof contracts, decentralization might
become optimal even if its direct bene￿t in terms of acquiring speci￿c knowledge about the
project vanishes. The reason is that with delegation of the project decision central management
implicitly commits to a higher second period incentive rate as personal e⁄ort and the project
decision must be controlled via the same incentive contract. This is bene￿cial if renegotiation-
proofness requires central management to set too low second-period incentives compared to
long-term commitment. A necessary condition for that is, that intertemporal correlation is
negative. Contrary to the classical view this result implies that the incentive problem under
centralization may become more severe than under decentralization.
21 Introduction
The bene￿ts and costs of decentralization (relative to centralization) have been largely discussed
in the literature. The main comparative advantage of delegating decision rights is seen in the
ability to use speci￿c knowledge of local managers for decision making.1 Its disadvantage is the
occurrence of incentive and control problems. Taking a mechanism-design view on the problem,
decentralization does never outperform centralization: The revelation principle ensures that
every mechanism in which decision authority is delegated to an agent can be replicated by a
mechanism in which the subordinate transmits the relevant information to central management
which then makes the decision.2 Importantly, this result does apply only in a world with costless
communication and an unconstraint contracting space. In practice, however, costly communica-
tion is a major reason for decentralized organizational structures (see Kaplan/Atkinson (1989)).
Thus, there is a need to investigate the value of delegation in settings in which the revelation
principle is not valid. There are many papers that compare decentralization and centralization
under di⁄erent circumstances (e.g., Baiman/Rajan (1995), Bushman/Indjejikian/Penno (2000),
Stein (2002)).
In this paper we take a dynamic perspective on the value of delegation. We consider a two-
period agency problem where central management hires an subordinate (agent) to perform an
action in each period. These actions which we call personal e⁄ort must be delegated due to time
constraints or lack of expertise by central management. In addition, at the beginning of the
second period a decision about launching a project has to be taken. This decision can either be
made by central management or it can be delegated to the agent. If the decision authority over
the project is delegated to the agent (decentralization), he privately learns the project￿ s true
contribution to ￿rm value at the end of the ￿rst period. If central management decides upon
the project (centralization) the project￿ s contribution will neither be observed by central man-
agement nor by the subordinate such that the decision has to be made based on expectations.3
The primary trade-o⁄ between both organizational forms that is emphasized in the literature
shows in our paper as follows: Under decentralization there is superior information about the
project￿ s value but its e¢ cient use through the agent must be controlled via an incentive contract
(together with personal e⁄ort). Under centralization there is no control problem with respect
to the project￿ s decision but relevant information is missing.
We analyze both organizational forms for two di⁄erent contracting regimes: long-term commit-
ment and long-term renegotiation-proof contracts. Under long-term commitment the classical
view on the trade-o⁄ between decentralization and centralization is con￿rmed. While the con-
1See Kaplan/Atkinson (1989), p. 526.
2See Melumad/Reichelstein (1988) who compare under which conditions a decentralized mechanism without
communication leads the same outcome as the optimal mechanism based on the revelation principle.
3In line with Milgrom/Roberts (1992), p. 544, we assume that decentralization does not only mean that the
agent is authorized to decide upon the project but also that he does not reside in the central o¢ ce but on the
scene. Under centralization he works in the central o¢ ce and has no possibility to gather speci￿c information.
3trol problem under decentralization is always as severe as under centralization the e⁄ect from
the project in each setting is less clear. We provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions such
that decentralization dominates centralization and vice versa. We ￿nd that high contributions
of both, personal e⁄ort and the project, yield that decentralization outperforms centralization.
While long-term commitment can be viewed as a theoretical benchmark it is implausible from
a practical perspective as it assumes that contracting parties can credibly commit to stick to
an incentive contract that is ex post ine¢ cient. Thereforewe analyze in a second step initial
long-term contracts that are robust against renegotiation (renegotiation-proof). We show that
the trade-o⁄ between both organizational forms with renegotiation-proof contracts di⁄ers sub-
stantially from the commitment setting. In particular, we show that with a renegotiation-proof
contract the induced control problemmay become more severe under centralization than under
decentralization. This implies that decentralization can dominate centralization even if its di-
rect bene￿t (in terms of speci￿c knowledge) is not present. The reason for this result is that
with the decision for a decentralized system central management implicitly commits to a higher
second period incentive rate as personal e⁄ort and the project decision must be controlled via
the same incentive contract. This is bene￿cial from an ex ante perspective if the renegotiation-
proof contract requires central management to set too low second-period incentives as compared
to long-term commitment. A necessary condition for this e⁄ect is that output is negatively
correlated across both periods.
Our paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the value of delegation in agencies with hid-
den action and hidden information. In this respect it is related to Bushman/Indjejikian/Penno
(2000) who analyze a one shot agency where the agent obtains pre-decision information about
the contribution of his unobservable e⁄ort under decentralization. Under centralization no such
information will be observed, however, e⁄ort is assumed to be observable and contractible. In
contrast to this setting we assume that under both organizational forms there are always in-
centive problems present as even under centralization some decisions must be delegated. We
analyze how the decision whether to delegate the project decision in￿ uences the optimal in-
centive contract and thus personal e⁄ort. Similar to Bushman/Indjejikian/Penno (2000) and
Raith (2008) we assume that the agent obtains private speci￿c knowledge without any cost. Our
focus is on incentives that provide an optimal decentral use of speci￿c knowledge. In contrast,
e.g., Demski/Sappington (1987) analyze the value of delegation when information acquisition is
costly.
We further contribute to the literature that analyzes mechanisms to mitigate distortions caused
by limited commitment in dynamic agencies. Especially in the accounting literature some prac-
tices usually labeled inferior have been proven optimal in such settings. E.g., Indjejikian/Nanda
(1999) show that aggregation of measures - that reduces degrees of freedom in incentive contract-
ing - might be optimal under limited commitment and Demski (1998), Christensen/Demski/Frimor
(2002), and Demski/Frimor (1999) show optimality of earnings management and performance
measure manipulation for similar reasons. The strategic value of delegation has been empha-
4sized in the early literature by Schelling (1960).4 It has been deeper analyzed in the presence of
competition (Vickers (1985), Fershtman/Judd (1987), G￿x/Sch￿ndube (2004)). Here delegation
serves as a commitment to act more aggressively in competition. In a public economics context
Melumad/Mookherjee (1989) show in a three-layer game, that it may be optimal for the gov-
ernment to delegate decisions over tax audit policies to revenue collecting agencies. This bene￿t
occurs as the government is unable to credibly commit to tax audit policies which may create
considerable welfare losses. Again, delegation of the decision authority here serves as a com-
mitment substitute. To our best knowledge the usefulness of decentralization as a commitment
device in a dynamic intra-￿rm incentive problem has not been shown yet.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. In sec-
tion 3 we analyze the value of delegation under long-term commitment. We determine the
equilibrium solutions for both organizational forms and provide conditions under which delega-
tion has positive value. In section 4 we investigate the optimal organizational structure under
renegotiation-proof contracts. Special attention is devoted to the value of delegation to reduce
welfare losses from limited commitment. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We analyze a two-period agency model where a central management (CM) hires an agent to
provide a personal e⁄ort in each period. The agent￿ s e⁄ort in period t = 1;2 is denoted by et.
Personal e⁄ort is unobservable and must be delegated to an agent, i.e. central management is
not able, e.g., due to time constraints, to provide this e⁄ort. The ￿rm￿ s output in period t (gross
of the agent￿ s compensation) is given by
x1 = ge1 + ￿1
x2 = ge2 + ￿b + ￿2
g > 0 is the marginal contribution of the agent￿ s e⁄ort. ￿1 and ￿2 are normally distributed
random variables with mean zero, variance ￿2 and correlation coe¢ cient ￿. Besides managerial
e⁄ort output in period 2 is in￿ uenced by the payo⁄ of a project. This project is initiated at the
beginning of the second period by a decision b and leads to a payo⁄ of ￿b. The project decision
can either be delegated to the agent (decentralization) or it can be made by central management
(centralization). With respect to the centralized regime two alternative scenarios are reasonable.
Either central management is as capable as the manager and makes the decision on b at the same
cost as the manager would do; the cost of b is b2=2. Or (similar to Bushman/Indjejikian/Penno
(2000)) the CM is able to force the manager to choose a certain b. Both scenarios lead to the
same results in our model. In the presentation of our model, however, we stick to the former
interpretation.

















Effort e2 and decision on b Output x2 and q
are observed
Figure 1: Timeline of Events
The factor ￿ of bin the project￿ s payo⁄is modeled as a binary random variable that takes 0 with
probability p and ￿ > 0 with 1 ￿ p. In a centralized ￿rm ￿ will not be observed before the
decision on b is made. Hence, the optimal b depends on E (￿) = (1 ￿ p)￿. In the decentralized
￿rm the agent receives speci￿c knowledge about the project￿ s payo⁄ at the beginning of the
second period. More precisely, we assume that the agent privately observes the contribution ￿
of b immediately before the deciding on b.
We consider the ￿rst period after the decentralized structure is implemented as a learning period.
The agent, residing outside the central o¢ ce, obtains general information about the project. This
general information enables him to deduce the project￿ s true contribution ￿ at the beginning of
the second period.
We assume that communication is costly such that it is not possible to transmit ￿ to central
management under decentralization. Furthermore, under decentralization the b-decision is un-
observable similar to personal e⁄ort. Under both regimes ￿ will be observed ex post, i.e. at the
end of period 2. Figure 1 summarizes the timeline of events.







To capture risk aversion we assume that the agent￿ s preferences can be represented by a mean-
variance functional5 of the form









as the manager￿ s residual wealth. S denotes
the agent￿ s compensation and r ￿ 0 is his risk aversion coe¢ cient. We restrict attention to a
long-term linear contract
S = f + s1x1 + s2x2 + s￿￿
with f as a ￿xed payment and s1;s2;s￿ as incentive weights for the contracting variables x1;x2,
and ￿. The agent￿ s reservation utility for the two-period duration of the agency is 0.
The central management is risk neutral. It selects contract S (and b with centralization) to




taking into account that the
5Notice that due to the binary random variable ￿ output in period 2 is no longer normally distributed such
that we cannot apply the LEN approach that derives mean variance preferences endogenously. To allow for closed
form solutions we thereform assume mean-variance preferences exogenously, like, e.g., Feltham/Wu (2001).
6contract must be individually rational and incentive compatible for the agent.
We distinguish two di⁄erent contracting regimes: Under long-term commitment a contract S
is settled at t = 0 and cannot be revised or renegotiated subsequently. Under a long-term
renegotiation-proof contract, we analyze a situation in which contracting parties cannot commit
not to renegotiate the contract after the ￿rst period. Thus we focus on initial contracts S that
are robust against renegotiation at the end of the ￿rst period.
3 Long-term commitment contracts
3.1 Centralized System
The solution to the centralized system can be decomposed into two independent problems: A
managerial e⁄ort (risk-incentive) problem and a project-decision problem. The project-decision
problem is given by
max
b
E (b￿) ￿ b2=2
and its solution is bc = E (￿) = (1 ￿ p)￿ with corresponding project payo⁄
Bc = E (￿)
2 =2 = (1 ￿ p)
2 ￿2=2: (1)
The remaining problem (the managerial e⁄ort problem) is to choose the parameters s1;s2;s￿,
and f of the compensation contract to induce actions e1 and e2 in the best interest of the central










￿(S;e) = E (S ￿ C (e)) ￿
r
2






The ￿rst constraint is the participation constraint for the agent which is binding at the opti-
mum. The second constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint for the agent￿ s e⁄ort. The
variance of the agent￿ s compensation is given by V ar(S) = V ar(s1x1 + s2x2 + s￿￿).
Lemma 1 The optimal weight for ￿ in the incentive contract is given by sc
￿ = ￿s2bc:Given sc
￿






Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 shows that given the optimal incentive weight sc
￿ the risk associated with the uncertain
project contribution ￿ is completely removed from the agent￿ s compensation. As ￿ is observable
6The variable x
￿b
2 is used to clarify that the payo⁄ from the managerial e⁄ort problem is calculated net of the
project￿ s payo⁄ B
c:
7at the end of the second period central management can perfectly insure the agent against the
risk of ￿. By setting s￿ equal to s2bc a perfectly negative correlation between s￿￿ and the agent￿ s
share s2bc￿ in the project￿ s payo⁄ ( in x2) is induced. Of course, if ￿ was not observable this
insurance possibility does not exist. However, it is reasonable to assume that the conditions
that a⁄ect the project￿ s payo⁄ become observable ex post. In addition, the result of Lemma 1
- which carries over to the decentralized regime as we will show later - simpli￿es the analysis
considerably as it removes terms that do not in￿ uence ￿rst order e⁄ects: Compensation risk is
still included by the performance measure risks ￿1;￿2.
>From Lemma 1 it also follows that given sc
￿ the agency-problem in (2) formally corresponds
to a standard LEN-model with multiple actions and performance measures, which is in depth






g2 + r￿2 + r￿￿2: (3)
The incentive rate for each period weights the squared productivity of the agent￿ s managerial
e⁄ort g2 in the numerator by a denominator that re￿ ects productivity g2, the risk associated
with the period￿ s compensation r￿2, and an intertemporal covariance e⁄ect r￿￿2. The latter
o⁄ers an insurance e⁄ect if ￿ < 0 and for positive correlation it imposes additional risk on the
agent￿ s compensation. For the subsequent investigation it is worthwhile to state the optimal s1




g2 + r￿2 . (4)
This "reaction function" is derived from the ￿rst order condition for s1 in program (2). It is
the same for every contracting environment (full commitment and renegotiation-proofness) and
for every organizational structure (centralization and decentralization) we consider. Writing
the central management￿ s payo⁄ from the managerial e⁄ort problem as a function of s2 by
substituting (4) for s1 into the objective function of (2) leads to


































g4 + 2g2r￿2 + ￿4r2 ￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿￿i
,
with G = g2 + r￿2. For the centralized regime we analyze in this section the corresponding
reaction function for s2, s￿
2 (s1); which is symmetric to (4) . As ￿r￿2￿ ￿ r￿2, it follows that
s1 ￿ 1 and s2 ￿ 1. If correlation is positive s￿
1 is diminishing in s2 and vice versa. This is the
additional risk e⁄ect mentioned above. It is increasing in s2. For negative correlation increasing
reaction functions o⁄er an insurance opportunity. Higher e⁄orts in both periods will be induced
due to a decreasing risk premium to be paid to the agent. With zero correlation one obtains the
standard one-shot LEN solution for both periods.
Inserting (3) for s2 into (5) leads to the following payo⁄ from the managerial e⁄ort problem:




8and to a total pro￿t of
Uc = Mc + Bc =
g4
G + r￿￿2 + (1 ￿ p)
2 ￿2: (6)
3.2 Decentralized regime
In the decentralized regime the decision on the optimal volume of the project b is delegated to
the agent. Immediately before his decision the agent observes the true value of ￿. As opposed
to the centralized regime, however, the agent does not necessarily choose b in the best interest
of the owners but he chooses the value of b that maximizes his preference functional ￿. For a
given incentive weight s2 in the second period the agent selects b to maximize
maxs2b￿ ￿ b2=2 (7)
which leads to an optimal b of
bd (s2) = s2￿. (8)
Inserting bd for b into (7) leads to a project payo⁄ of ￿2
2 s2 (2 ￿ s2) conditional on ￿ and to an ex






s2 (2 ￿ s2). (9)
In contrast to the centralized regime, in the decentralized regime it is not possible to decompose
the whole problem into a managerial e⁄ort problem and a project related problem both being
independent. s2 in￿ uences the optimal b (and Bd) and the managerial e⁄ort problem, such
that both problems must be considered simultaneously. The central management￿ s optimization
problem to be solved is given by
max
s1;s2;s￿;f




















Problem (10) di⁄ers in two respects from problem (2) above. First, the agent now decides upon
b which leads to the additional incentive constraint b = s2￿. Second, as b is random ex ante its
personal cost are random, too, and as such the cost in￿ uences also the variance of the agent￿ s
wealth.
Similar to the centralized regime we ￿rst show that the optimal incentive weight sd
￿ eliminates
any risk associated with ￿ from the agent￿ s compensation:














9Proof. See the appendix.
The following Lemma states the solution for the optimal incentive weights s1 and s2 and the
corresponding surplus of the central management.












GyG + r￿2 (g2 + r￿2 (1 ￿ ￿2))
with Gy = g2 + ￿2 (1 ￿ p). The central management￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ is
Ud = Md + Bd












Proof. See the Appendix.
3.3 Comparison of organizational forms
In this section we clarify the trade-o⁄ between both systems and investigate by which variables
the trade-o⁄is signi￿cantly driven. We also provide comparative static results and conditions for
one organizational form being superior to the other. We ￿rst analyze di⁄erences in the incentive
weights s1 and s2.
Lemma 4 sc
2 ￿ sd























,t = 1;2; ac-
cording to the results of sections 3.1 and 3.2.
As in the decentralized regime the second period incentive rate has to control two decisions (b and
e2) it is always (weakly) higher than in the centralized regime. From the reaction function (4)
we know that for positive (negative, no) correlation ￿; s1 is increasing (decreasing, not varying)
in s2. Thus, depending on the sign of the correlation coe¢ cient ￿rst period incentives under
centralization are either higher (￿ > 0), lower (￿ < 0) or the same compared to decentralization.
Given this result we are able to provide a graphical representation of the trade-o⁄ between
both regimes. Notice, that according to (6) and Lemma 3 CM￿ s total surplus consists of a
surplus B which refers to the project￿ s payo⁄ and a surplus M which is the surplus from the
managerial e⁄ort problem net of B. Let ￿M ￿ Mc ￿ Md and ￿B ￿ Bc ￿ Bd. We start
analyzing the di⁄erences between both regimes with regard to the managerial e⁄ort problem
10Figure 2: Payo⁄ from managerial e⁄ort depending on s2
in ￿gure 2. We plot M (s2) the maximum surplus from the managerial e⁄ort problem as a
function of s2 according to the de￿nition in (5). This function has its maximum at s2 = sc
2,
the optimal incentive rate in the centralized regime. As in the decentralized regime the second-
period incentive rate is higher than sc
2, the induced managerial risk-incentive problem under
decentralization is always (weakly) more severe than under centralization, ￿M ￿ 0.














￿ (1 ￿ p)
￿
=2 as a function of sd
2 for the same parameters as
in ￿gure 2. The higher sd
2 the higher the relative bene￿t from decentralization as with increasing
second period incentives the project decision of the agent becomes more congruent with the
objectives of CM. In the limit sd
2 ! 1 the "￿rst-best" choice for b is induced and the relative
advantage of decentralization with respect to the project￿ s payo⁄ becomes maximal. As (except
for p = 1) ￿B is strictly decreasing in sd
2 and ￿B (0) > 0 and ￿B (1) < 0 the intermediate value
theorem guarantees a unique null (critical value) scrit





= 0 and ￿B < (>)0
if sd
2 > (<) scrit:
2 . For the given parameters of the plot the resulting value is denoted by sd￿
2 .
Hence, for the parameters of the plots centralization dominates decentralization with respect to
the incentive problem but decentralization dominates centralization with respect to the project￿ s
payo⁄. While the former holds true for all parameters the latter depends.
In the following proposition we provide su¢ cient conditions for the dominance of centralization
and decentralization, respectively. Of course, non-validity of the conditions are necessary for the
11Figure 3: ￿B depending on sd
2
dominance relation being the other way around.
Proposition 1 (Su¢ cient conditions and comparative statics)
a)If p ! 0; Uc ￿ Ud
Assume 0 < p < 1 in what follows.




=@￿ (r) > 0. If ￿ (r) is su¢ ciently high (low) Uc > Ud ￿
Uc < Ud￿
d)If the contribution of managerial action (g) or contribution of the special task in the good case
(￿) are su¢ ciently high, Uc < Ud.
Proof. See the Appendix.
p = 0 means that the contribution of the project is ￿ with certainty. Hence, there is a strict
advantage of centralization with respect to both the managerial e⁄ort problem and the delegation
problem except for the special case of ￿ = ￿1 that we discuss subsequently to proposition 2.
For strictly positive values of p, if the manager is risk neutral or there is no noise in the output
the optimal incentive rates are s1 = s2 = 1 in both regimes. This implies that ￿M = 0 and
as optimal incentives for b are motivated ￿B < 0. Part c) of the proposition shows that if
the manager￿ s risk aversion or the variance of the noise in the performance measures increases,
centralization becomes more bene￿cial relative to decentralization, and vice versa. An increase
in r or ￿ has two e⁄ects: First, it reduces sd
2 such that lower incentives for b are provided and Bd
declines. As Bc does not depend on r or ￿ the loss from delegation ￿B becomes larger if r or
12￿ increase. Second, higher r or ￿ reduce sc
2 and the impact of the managerial e⁄ort problem on
the overall surplus becomes smaller. Notice, however, that for low r or ￿ the di⁄erence between
sc
2 and sd
2 is reduced if these parameters increase. Therefore, for low values for r and ￿ ￿M
may decrease if risk aversion or variance are increasing. For higher values of both variables, the
marginal e⁄ect on sc
2 ￿ sd
2 and ￿M is increasing. However, the overall marginal e⁄ect of r and
￿ on Uc ￿ Ud is always positive. Notice that r and ￿ are always multiplicatively connected in
the model. For every set of parameters there exists a critical value for c r￿ such that Uc = Ud
and Uc > (<)Ud if r￿ > (<) c r￿.
The e⁄ect of a su¢ cient highly value for ￿ is as follows. If ￿ becomes very large sd
2 approaches
to 1. This means that the induced b in the decentralized regime is close to the ￿rst best one. In
addition with ￿ very high the project￿ s (expected) contribution rises and therefore the advantage
to decide on b based on actual instead of the expected contribution rises. Overall this implies
that ￿B becomes very negative if ￿ becomes very high and in the limit ￿B ! ￿1. On the
other hand, the higher ￿ the higher the deviation sd
2 from the optimum sc
2 in the managerial
e⁄ort problem. This e⁄ect, however, does not approach in￿nity. If ￿ becomes large, sd
2 as
mentioned above approaches unity. That means that the maximum e⁄ect from an increase in ￿
with respect to the managerial e⁄ort problem is Mc (sc
2) ￿ Md (1). That means, if ￿ becomes
su¢ ciently high the e⁄ect on ￿B dominates the e⁄ect on ￿M and Uc < Ud.
The e⁄ect on an increasing e⁄ort productivity g is related to the argumentation before. Ceteris
paribus the higher g the closer sd
2 at unity and the closer the agent￿ s project decision at ￿rst-
best. Thus, if g becomes su¢ ciently high decentralization becomes dominant with respect to
the project￿ s payo⁄. But not only sd
2 gets closer to 1 if g increases but also the optimal second
period incentive weight under centralization, sc
2. This implies that the relative advantage of
centralization with respect to the managerial e⁄ort problem decreases in g such that the overall
marginal e⁄ect of an increasing g favors decentralization.




=@￿ > 0 if ￿ < 0.
b)If ￿ ! ￿1 Uc < Ud.
With negative correlation, ￿ < 0, centralization becomes more pro￿table relative to decentral-
ization if the intertemporal insurance opportunities decrease (￿ increases). This e⁄ect is due to






insurance e⁄ect is diminishing sd













is not unique. Its sign depends on whether sc
2 ￿ sd
2 is increasing or decreasing in ￿






is always dominant. A similar e⁄ect for positive correlation cannot be shown.
The reason is that with positively correlated outputs there is no insurance opportunity and both
reaction functions sd
1 (s2) and sd
2 (s1) are falling. If the reduction of s1 due to an increase of ￿
13is very strong the optimal sd
2 may become increasing in ￿.
If outputs are perfectly negative correlated, risk is completely eliminated from the manager￿ s
compensation package and the optimal solution is to sell the ￿rm to the agent: s1 = s2 = 1;
independently of the regime. As a consequence the managerial e⁄ort problem will be solved
￿rst-best under both regimes. Furthermore, optimal incentives will be motivated for the project
under decentralization; therefore Uc < Ud.
4 Long-term renegotiation-proof-contracts
4.1 Renegotiation and renegotiation proofness
It is hard to believe that contracting parties can credibly commit not to renegotiate a long-term
contract if there are ex post gains from renegotiation. In our setting such ex post bene￿ts may
result from an improved trade-o⁄ between risk and incentives after some uncertainty has been
resolved. In what follows we therefore allow the central management to o⁄er the agent a new
contract for the second period at the end of the ￿rst period, i.e., after output x1 has been
observed. It has been shown in the literature7 that the equilibrium solution of the contracting
game with renegotiation coincides with a long-term renegotiation-proof contract. Renegotiation-
proofness means that the initial contract has to be sequentially optimal; i.e., at the beginning of
the second period the central management must not have an incentive to o⁄er a new contract to
the agent. For linear contracting models with two-periods Christensen/Feltham/Sabac (2003)
have shown that an initial long-term contract is renegotiation-proof if incentive weights for
second period measures are chosen sequentially optimal. In our model there are two contractible
measures in the second period, x2 and ￿, with incentive weights s2 and s￿, respectively. For both
regimes, centralization and decentralization, we now have to consider the constraints s2 = sR
2
and s￿ = sR
￿ on the initial long-term contract, where R denotes renegotiation-proofness. Similar
to the full commitment setting the risk associated with ￿ is completely removed from the agent￿ s
compensation in the optimal renegotiation-proof contract as is stated in following lemma:
Lemma 5 Lemmas 1 and 2 also apply with renegotiation-proof contracts.
Proof. As ￿ and x1 are independent, the optimal s￿ for a given s2 is identical to the long-term
commitment setting.
Lemma 5 does not imply that the optimal s￿ under a renegotiation-proof contract is the same
as under full commitment, but it is the same conditional on s2 such that the same risk sharing
e⁄ect is induced.
7See, e.g., Fudenberg/Tirole (1990).
14Prior research has analyzed the conditions under which renegotiation is harmless and leads to
the same results than a full commitment contract.8 For the linear model considered here, ￿ = 0
is a su¢ cient condition that renegotiation does not destroy the incentives of the ex ante e¢ cient
long-term contract. For ￿ = 0 there is no intertemporal risk-sharing e⁄ect such that the optimal
renegotiation-proof-contract coincides with the optimal long-term contract. For the following
analysis we therefore assume ￿ 6= 0:
4.2 Equilibrium results
Formally the optimal renegotiation-proof contract under both organizational forms is deter-
mined by solving the respective full commitment problems from section 3 under the additional
renegotiation-proofness constraint s2 = sR
2 . As the optimal b under centralization does not de-
pend on the contracting regime it is the same as under full commitment, bc. In the decentralized
regime the manager￿ s choice of b conditional on ￿ and s2 is similar to full commitment, except
we have to replace s2 by the renegotiation-proof incentive rate sR










The sequentially optimal incentive weight sR
2 maximizes the expected second period surplus of










Here we have already included the optimal s￿ as described in Lemma 5 and its e⁄ect on the
induced variance of the agent￿ s wealth. We denote the posterior variance of ￿2 given x1 as ￿P
2 . It
is given by ￿P
2 = ￿2 ￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
. Solving optimization program (11) for both organizational forms
leads to the following result:
Lemma 6 Second period sequentially optimal incentive weights in the centralized regime (C)








g2 + ￿2 (1 ￿ p)
g2 + ￿2 (1 ￿ p) + r￿P
2
.
Proof. See the appendix.
With renegotiation-proof-contracts, as under full commitment, the second period incentive rate
under decentralization is higher than under centralization as the manager￿ s b- choice must be
motivated, too. As before let M (s2) be the central management￿ s payo⁄ from the managerial
e⁄ort problem as function of s2. M (s2) is the same for both regimes and given by (5). In





8See Fudenberg/Holmstr￿m/Milgrom (1990) and for linear models Indjejikian/Nanda (1999) and Chris-
tensen/Feltham/Sabac (2003).
15given by (1) and (9) with sd
2 = sRd
2 . Thus, central management￿ s equilibrium surplus with


















4.3 Comparison of organizational forms
In this section we compare both organizational forms in terms of the trade-o⁄between managerial
e⁄ort allocation and induced project decision b. As we will see the results may di⁄er substantially
from the full commitment setting. First, we compare the ex ante e¢ cient second-period incentive




￿ (1 + ￿)g2r￿2















>From (12) we see that for negatively correlated outputs (except for ￿ = ￿1) renegotiation-
proofness leads to too low powered second period incentives, while for ￿ > 0 second period
incentives are too high powered compared to the ex ante e¢ cient solution sc
2. The reason is
that the posterior variance ￿P
2 = ￿2 ￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
of the agent￿ s wealth decreases with increasing
quadratic correlation while the prior variance is increasing in ￿.10 As already argued above,
for uncorrelated outputs there is no di⁄erence between full commitment and renegotiation-proof
contracts.
Notice that depending on the parameters of the model sRd
2 can take any value between zero and
one; but it is always greater than sRc
2 . This leads to the following result:
Proposition 3 With renegotiation-proof contracts the solution to the managerial e⁄ort problem











This result is in sharp contrast to the solutions to the managerial e⁄ort problems under long-
term commitment. With long-term commitment under centralization sc
2 was chosen to maximize
M (s2) while under decentralization sd







With renegotiation-proof-contracts the renegotiation-proofnesss constraint s2 = sR
2 generally











depends on how strong sRc
2 deviates from the maximum sc
2 relative to sRd
2
and it depends on whether sRc
2 sets too high or too low powered incentives as compared to sc
2.
To clarify this point consider ￿gure 4.




2 = 1; see also the paragraph following Proposition 2.
10See also Christensen/Feltham/Sabac (2005).
16Figure 4: Payo⁄s from managerial e⁄ort problem
Figure 4 plots M (s2) and second period incentive weights sRc
2 , sRd
2 and sc
2 for [p = 1=2, r = 1,
￿ = 5, ￿ = 2, g = 2, ￿ = ￿3=4]. sc
2 maximizes M (s2). Under centralization renegotiation-
proofness forces the central management to implement a second period incentive rate sRc
2 that is
too low compared to sc
2. As under decentralization the renegotiation-proof value of s2 is higher
than under centralization there is a potential gain of delegating the project with respect to the
managerial e⁄ort problem. In ￿gure 4 this case indeed occurs: sRd
2 is closer to the maximum
than sRd
2 . However, this positive e⁄ect of delegating b on M can only occur if sRc




2 is higher than optimal, sRd
2 is always even higher which necessarily
leads to a lower M. Even if sRc
2 < sc
2, delegation is only bene￿cial if sRd
2 is not too far beyond
the optimal level. The next Proposition formalizes the latter conditions:










then ￿ < 0.


















Proof. See the Appendix.










. ￿ < 0 ensures that under
centralization the second period renegotiation-proof incentive rate is lower than ex ante optimal.









in ￿gure 4 and draw a horizontal line to the right until the curve M (s2)
is touched. All values for sRd






Condition b) of Proposition 4 restricts sRd
2 to take values on this line. Proposition 3 and 4 have
an important conclusion which we state as a separate corollary
17Corollary 1 Under the conditions of Proposition 4 the incentive and control problem under
centralization is more severe than under decentralization. Hence, decentralization may become
optimal even if there is not a direct bene￿t of it in terms of speci￿c knowledge.
Suppose the agent does not receive any speci￿c knowledge about the project￿ s payo⁄ (either
because ￿ is not random, or because it is not observed by the agent). Then, classical view
would argue that delegation cannot be optimal. Indeed, if we look at the direct payo⁄s from






￿ 0. In addition, under long-term
commitment ￿M ￿ 0 as the coordination problem with respect to managerial e⁄ort is more
severe. With renegotiation-proof-contracts, that are even more realistic than full commitment
contracts, under the conditions of Proposition 4 there is a direct bene￿t of decentralization on the
incentive problem with respect to managerial e⁄ort compared to centralization. Formally, this
bene￿t occurs because decentralization relaxes the renegotiation-proofness constraint s2 = sR
2
relative to centralization. Intuitively, by delegating the decision on b to the agent the central
management implicitly itself himself to a higher sequentially optimal incentive rate sR
2 . This
commitment is bene￿cial if the central management has an incentive to set low incentives at the
beginning of period two.
Having focussed on the managerial e⁄ort problems yet, we now want to analyze the in￿ uence of

















2 < 0: The higher the renegotiation-
proof second-period incentive weight the higher the relative payo⁄ from decentralization from
the project. An increase of sRd
2 , however, my result from di⁄erent changes of parameters. The
following proposition clari￿es comparative static e⁄ects on ￿B and provides a necessary and
su¢ cient condition for decentralization/centralization being optimal with respect to the project
decision.






























@￿ < (>)0, i⁄ ￿ > (=;<) 0.





￿2 increases in p, part a) of the proposition implicitly de￿nes a critical value pcrit
such that decentralization becomes dominant if p > pcrit. However, this also implies that










indirect e⁄ect via sRd
2 that is positive. Hence, the total e⁄ect depends on the speci￿c parameter





￿2 whereas the indirect is negative. In contrast, the comparative statics







2 . While sRd
2 is increasing in g and ￿ (if positive) it is decreasing in ￿;r and ￿ (if negative).
The lower sRd
2 the greater the distortion in the manager￿ s project choice under decentralization
such that centralization becomes comparatively advantageous.
We conclude this section by a numerical example using the following parameters: [p = 0;￿ =
￿0:95;g = 13;￿ = 8;r = 5;￿ = 10]. p = 0 captures the extreme case that decentralization has


















￿ = ￿B + ￿M
0:871 0:776 0:827 0:958 ￿1:174 ￿0:216
Table 1: Numerical example
Table 1 shows that for the given parameters sRc
2 < sc























. By de￿nition, if there is no uncertainty
with respect to the project￿ s contribution, the direct payo⁄ under centralization must exceed its
counterpart under decentralization, such that ￿B > 0. However, the e⁄ect on the managerial
e⁄ort problem dominates and thus ￿ < 0: decentralization turns out to be optimal.
5 Conclusion
Conventional wisdom suggests that decentralizing decision rights creates costly incentive and
coordination problems for ￿rms relative to centralized decision making. On the other hand,
the bene￿ts of decentralization include improved decision making due to the use of speci￿c
knowledge. We analyze the cost and bene￿ts of decentralization in a two-period agency model.
We consider a ￿rm consisting of a central management and a subordinate (agent). Central
management is not able to make all operational and strategic decisions. Therefore, authority
for some decisions must be delegated to the subordinate. We call these actions personal e⁄ort.
Personal e⁄ort has a certain contribution and has to be performed in every period by the agent.
To induce proper decisions an incentive contract is needed. In addition to e⁄ort there is a project
which requires a decision in period two. The contribution from the project is uncertain. In a
decentralized regime the decision right for the project is delegated to the agent. Working on the
job, the agent￿ s receives speci￿c knowledge about the project￿ s contribution. In a centralized
regime central management decides upon the project based on prior information.
Our model captures the main trade-o⁄ between centralization and decentralization: Under de-
centralization speci￿c knowledge can be used to decide upon the project, however, the agent￿ s
project decision has to be aligned with the interests of central management via an incentive
contract along with personal e⁄ort. We analyze this trade-o⁄ for two di⁄erent contracting set-
tings and provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the preferability of the one or other
organizational form.
19Under long-term commitment the classical view is con￿rmed. The incentive problem under
decentralization is at least as severe as under centralization. With respect to the project￿ s
payo⁄ centralization or decentralization may be preferred. Which organizational architecture is
overall preferred depends on the project￿ s as well as the personal e⁄ort￿ s contribution and the
induced risk of the agent￿ s compensation. High contributions of both, e⁄ort and the project,
lead decentralization to be the optimal regime.
Long-term commitment may be regarded as a theoretical benchmark but from a practical per-
spective it has an important shortcoming: It requires the contracting parties to credibly commit
to not renegotiate the initial contract, even if there are ex post bene￿ts from renegotiation.
Therefore, we consider long-term renegotiation-proof contracts as the more realistic contracting
setting. The main result from this analysis is that the "conventional cost" of decentralization
(relative to centralization) may turn into a bene￿t. More precisely, the incentive problem under
centralization may become more severe than under decentralization. The reason is that with
renegotiation-proof contracts central management is forced to o⁄er an initial contract that must
be sequentially optimal at the end of the ￿rst period. Depending on the stochastic output struc-
ture this constraint may lead the central management to motivate too low or too high personal
e⁄ort from an ex ante perspective. Under decentralization central management is forced to set
a higher second period incentive weight than under centralization as besides personal e⁄ort the
project decision has to be controlled, too. Hence, if renegotiation-proofness leads central man-
agement to o⁄er a too low second period incentive rate, decentralization may relax the ￿rm￿ s
incentive problem. This implies that decentralization may be preferred even if there is no di-
rect bene￿t of it in terms of speci￿c knowledge. As this result has been derived in the more
realistic setting of renegotiation-proof contracts the classical view may be revisited in dynamic
environments.
20Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
As s￿ does not in￿ uence the agent￿ s incentives it will be chosen to minimize der variance of the





with V ar(S) = V ar(s1x1 + s2x2 + s￿￿) = V ar(s1￿1 + s2￿2 + (s￿ + s2b)￿). This expression is
minimized w.r.t. s￿ by sc
￿ = ￿s2b. Given s￿ = sc







Proof of Lemma 2

























1V ar(￿1) + s2



































V ar(￿) = ￿s2
2￿=2. Inserting s￿ = sd




























￿4p(1 ￿ p) + ￿4p(1 ￿ p) ￿ 2￿4p(1 ￿ p)
￿
=






Proof of Lemma 3
Inserting in program (10) the binding participation constraint ￿(S;e;b) = 0 and the incentive
constraints and sd
￿ = ￿s2























The ￿rst-order conditions for s1 and s2 are given by
@U
@s1
= g2 (1 ￿ s1) ￿ r￿2 (s1 + s2￿) = 0
@U
@s2
= g2 (1 ￿ s2) + (1 ￿ p)￿2 (1 ￿ s2) ￿ r￿2 (s2 + s1￿) = 0.




















￿g2 ￿ r￿2 ￿￿r￿2
￿￿r￿2 ￿g2 ￿ r￿2 + (p ￿ 1)￿2
!
is negative de￿nite, the su¢ cient con-



















































Proof of Proposition 1
According to (6) and Lemma 3 Uc ￿ Ud is given by
Uc ￿ Ud =
￿4r2￿4 (1 + ￿)




g2 + r￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(￿2r(1 + ￿) + g2)(￿4r2 (￿2 ￿ 1) + ￿2r(￿2 (p ￿ 1) ￿ 2g2) ￿ g2 (g2 + ￿2 (1 ￿ p)))
2
+
(1 ￿ p)￿2 ￿









2 are given in (14) above. .
a) For p = 0 Uc ￿ Ud reduces to
￿
r￿2 (1 + ￿)￿
￿2 ￿
r￿2 (1 ￿ ￿) + g2￿
2(g2 (g2 + ￿2 + 2r￿2) + ￿2r￿2 + r2￿4 (1 ￿ ￿2))(g2 + r￿2 (1 + ￿))
￿ 0.









r2￿3 (p ￿ 1)￿2 (1 + ￿)
2 ￿
q1￿6 + q2￿4 + q3￿2 + q4
￿
(￿4r2 (￿2 ￿ 1) + ￿2r(￿2 (p ￿ 1) ￿ 2g2)￿g2 (g2 + ￿2 (1 ￿ p)))
2 (￿2r(1 + ￿) + g2)
2
with
q1 = ￿r3 (￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿)
￿
2g2 (￿ ￿ 1) + ￿2 (p ￿ 1)
￿
< 0
q2 = ￿2g2 (￿ ￿ 1)r2 ￿





￿2 (1 ￿ p)(5 ￿ 2￿) + g2 (6 ￿ 2￿)
￿
< 0.
q4 = 2g6￿2 (p ￿ 1) ￿ 2g8 < 0.
Hence,
@(Uc￿Ud)
@￿ > 0. Furthermore, lim￿!1
￿
Uc ￿ Ud￿
= ￿2 (1 ￿ p)
2 =2:Therefore, there exists
￿0 > 0 such that Uc = Udand Uc > (<)Ud if ￿ < (>)￿0. As r and ￿ are multiplicatively







2 with l1 = ￿2 (1 ￿ p) +
r￿2 (6 ￿ 2￿), l2 = 2(￿ ￿ 1)r￿2 ￿
￿2 (p ￿ 1) ￿ r￿2 (3 + ￿)
￿
and
22l3 = r2￿4 ￿
2r￿2 ￿
1 + ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2￿
+ ￿2 (1 ￿ p)
￿
1 ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿2￿￿
. As the factor of g6 is positive,
@(Uc￿Ud)
@g becomes zero if g = gcrit and remains negative for all g > gcrit, where gcrit depends on




2￿2p(p ￿ 1) < 0 from the
intermediate value theorem it follows that there exists another critical g0 > 0 for g such that












m1 = (1 ￿ p)2p
￿
g2 + r￿2￿￿
g2 + r￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿





g2 + r￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿2 ￿
r2￿4 (p ￿ 1)(1 + ￿)






= ￿1. Applying the same arguments as for g shows that there
exists ￿0 > 0 such that Uc (￿0) ￿ Ud (￿0) = 0 and Uc ￿ Ud < 0 for ￿ > ￿0.







2 with k3 = ￿g2￿6r3 <
0;k2 = Gr2￿4 ￿
g2 + ￿2 (1 ￿ p)
￿
> 0;k1 = r￿2G2 ￿
g2 + ￿2 (1 ￿ p)
￿
=;k0 = ￿g2G2 ￿
G + ￿2 (1 ￿ p)
￿
;
and G = g2 + r￿2. As ￿k3 < k2￿ + k1;
@(Uc￿Ud)
@￿ > 0 if ￿ < 0.
b) For ￿ = ￿1 we obtain Uc ￿ Ud = ￿2p(p ￿ 1)=2 < 0:
c) For ￿ = 0 we obtain Uc ￿ Ud =
￿2(p￿1)[￿2Gp2￿(G2+G￿2)p+r2￿4]
2G(￿2(p￿1)￿G) with G = g2 + r￿2. For
p^ =r￿2
￿2 < 1 it results ￿(￿2￿r￿2)(G+￿2)gr￿2
2￿2G(g2+￿2) < 0 and
@(Uc￿Ud)
@p < 0 which proves the claim.
Proof of Lemma 6










































































































23Proof of Proposition 4












2. From (12) we know that sRc
2 < sc
2
if and only if ￿ < 0.












as long as sRd
2 < 2sc
2 ￿ sRc





r￿2 (￿ + 1)
￿




(p ￿ 1) ￿ 2g2￿
￿
G ￿ r￿2￿2￿￿
(G + r￿2￿)(G ￿ r￿2￿2)(G ￿ r￿2￿2 + ￿2 (1 ￿ p))
> 0.
As the denominator is positive and is positive, too, 2sc
2￿sRc
2 ￿sRd









Proof of Proposition 5



























2￿2 (p ￿ 1)g￿4r2 (￿ ￿ 1)
2 (￿ + 1)
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2￿2 (p ￿ 1)￿3r2 (￿ ￿ 1)
2 (￿ + 1)
2 ￿
￿g2 ￿ ￿2 (1 ￿ p)
￿

























2￿2 (p ￿ 1)￿4r2￿ (￿ ￿ 1)(￿ + 1)
￿
￿g2 ￿ ￿2 (1 ￿ p)
￿
(G + ￿2 (1 ￿ p) ￿ r￿2￿2)
3 > (<)0 if ￿ < (=) > 0.
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